

## BOOK REVIEWS.

THE REALM OF ENDS OR PLURALISM AND THEISM: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Years 1907-10. By James Ward. Cambridge (England): The University Press; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911. Pp. xv, 490.

The object of Professor Ward's second series of Gifford Lectures is to furnish a more detailed and constructive working out of the Idealism which in the first series chiefly showed itself in a general criticism of Naturalism. It may be true that nothing really exists but spirit or spirits; but this is not obvious and there seem to be facts that contradict it. Hence the necessity for the idealist of the kind of detailed work, which Professor Ward here undertakes, to show that those aspects of the world that we commonly regard as typical of matter are perfectly compatible with the existence of nothing but mind. It is again, of course, open to the idealist as to everyone else to lay stress on the unity or the differentiation of the universe, and Professor Ward, as the title of his lecture indicates, starts from the latter. He has therefore to defend his position, on the one hand, against persons who are not idealists and to prove to them that what is real is not matter but spirit; and, on the other hand, against idealists who think unity logically prior to plurality, he has to prove that what is real is not spirit but spirits. Finally, in the second part of the book, an attempt is made to show that we have a right to introduce more unity into our theory of the world than a pluralism based on purely empirical grounds will warrant, and that this additional unity is to be found in a creative God who is not, however, the Absolute of the monistic idealist.

The more direct arguments against the naturalist with which the book opens are admittedly but a summary of those of "Naturalism and Agnosticism." There must always be a dualism of subject and object, and it may be convenient for the purposes of science to consider the latter apart from the former. But to carry this abstraction back into philosophy, as being the whole truth, leads to inseparable difficulties when we have to

deal with the facts of mental life and the relation of mind to body. Again, physics no longer holds that its atoms and ether are real over against the perceptible world, but that they are a descriptive scheme for enabling us to forecast events under definite perceptible circumstances in that world. Finally, what Professor Ward calls 'real categories' as distinct from merely descriptive ones have been actually obtained from analogy with minds: such are efficient causation, substance, and the unity of nature. In a great measure I am in agreement with Professor Ward's criticisms here. But, of course, to refute naturalism is not necessarily to prove idealism, since it is quite possible to hold that matter may exist as well as mind and that, when left to itself, it obeys the laws of conservation of energy and momentum, but that it can also be moved by minds when it stands in appropriate relations to them. Nor does it seem safe to rest very much on the doctrine that physical science is merely descriptive without a prolonged discussion of precisely what is meant by description. If the assumption of the existence of certain entities obeying certain laws accounts for what is actually found to be true, must we not say that this fact increases the probability of the assumption, and so that a successful description is some guarantee that the entities that are assumed by it to exist really do so? But, of course, this very line of argument furnishes a justification for Professor Ward's main procedure in the present work. For the fact is that the assumptions of physics account very well for what can be observed of inanimate matter and, when rightly understood, are not intrinsically impossible, but they do not succeed very well with animated matter or mind. If then Professor Ward can show that the assumption that nothing exists but minds will account as well for the behavior of apparently inanimate matter and better for that of animated bodies and minds, he will be justified in holding that his hypothesis has great probability.

Professor Ward makes a great deal of the contrast between science and history which we see when we take the world as it appears at first sight. Naturalism attempts to replace all history by science, and his view would be that when there seems to be nothing but science, there is still history of a simple kind. As I understand it, the distinction intended is that history describes unique individuals and their acts, whilst science deals with laws and with individuals merely as instances of them. It does not

appear to me that Professor Ward's theory of matter is really any more history than that of a pure naturalist. If Professor Ward had to deal with the particular monads that constitute a particular piece of matter by name, and could state no general laws about them, this would be history, and, as such, I submit, it would be far less valuable as philosophy than what he actually offers us. But what he actually offers us is the general law that monads, though they are unique individuals, agree in certain respects, that, for instance, they may acquire habits and lose initiative, and that then they exhibit the uniformities that are commonly supposed to characterize matter. This might perhaps be described as a conversion of physics into sociology, but not as a conversion of science into history. A pluralistic philosophy may require unique individuals, but its statements about them must be general, for otherwise it would have to refer to them by an infinite number of proper names. With regard to Professor Ward's attitude toward pluralism, I think the following is a fair statement as far as concerns the first part of the book at any rate. The world, as we know it, is on the face of it a more or less unified plurality, and even a singularistic philosophy must at least start from this appearance. But, on the one hand, the arguments of the singularist to prove on metaphysical grounds that there must really be a great deal more unity than there appears to be, are invalid, and, on the other hand, if we accept the singularist's Absolute, the appearance of the many, as we know them, from which the singularist himself must start, becomes inexplicable. Hence arise the following questions: May we not suppose that the intimacy of the union of the many is not fixed but increases as times goes on? And if so, what is the minimum amount of unity that we must assume in the beginning to account for that which has now been reached, and how much more unification may we reasonably expect in the future? These questions Professor Ward attempts to answer on the initial supposition that all that is real is minds.

Professor Ward's arguments against Singularism occur in the second chapter. He, of course, admits that there must be some unity, but he denies that the amount of unity that the singularist requires is compatible with the observable characteristics of the differentiations. If we are to make the Absolute a mind, and to know what we mean by that statement, we must suppose it to be analogous in essential respects to the minds that we do

know. Now these minds involve a subjective and an objective side, which are distinguishable though united. To suppose that the Absolute mind can manage with nothing but the subject side is to make an abstraction that has every appearance of being unwarrantable. To suppose that the object side is enough is to relapse into naturalism. Hence there remain the possibilities: (1) that the Absolute is in some sense its own Other, and (2) that its unity is something that transcends the distinction of subject and object. If the latter view be accepted, we must ask the singularist by what right he continues to call that a mind which has lost the most characteristic feature of minds that we know. The former view is supposed to be supported by the analogy of self-consciousness in finite minds. But these at least are never conscious of self without also being conscious of not-self, and this may be essential to any mind. Professor Ward does not perhaps pay enough attention to the alternative that Lotze, whose discussion on this subject is excellent, suggests, viz., that the necessity of an Other either for stirring the Ego into that activity that ends in self-consciousness or as an essential part of the total object of its cognition may depend on the finitude of the finite mind and not be essential to mind in general. But we may agree that unless there is some positive ground for supposing that a mind can exist without this limitation, we practise an unjustifiable abstraction in assuming such a mind. If (as seems to me necessary, though I do not think Professor Ward would admit it) we suppose that entities like colors and sounds are objects to minds, and yet cannot exist except when perceived, it seems to me possible to suppose a single mind whose Other entirely consisted of objects whose existence depended on their being objects to that mind. But the difficulty of making the Absolute a mind of this sort is that we cannot suppose that we ourselves and the other (minds) finite minds that we believe to exist are objects like colors and sounds. So that it is really over the relation of the many finite minds to the one Absolute one that singularism seems to break down. On this question some discussion of the metaphysical bearing of the case of Sally Beauchamp,—the most important new piece of relevant empirical fact that has emerged since Lotze discussed this subject,—would have been welcome from a psychologist of Professor Ward's eminence.

Having decided for spiritualistic pluralism, Professor Ward now tries to see how little unity need be put in at the beginning

to get out as much as we now have. He thinks it enough to assume that all the individuals strive to better themselves and to conserve what they have already won; the obstacles against which they strive are the strivings of other monads; each monad 'perceives' every other; and the Leibnitian Principle of Continuity. Professor Ward thinks that the history of human societies and of biological organisms will show us that with these assumptions an increasing amount of unity can be obtained and that it is reasonable to suppose by analogy that there has all along been a similar process from a state of less to one of greater unification. The apparent lack of spontaneity and the complete predictability that rules in the realm of matter is to be explained by the analogy of unprogressive societies, which have become hidebound in habits. The constants of physics, moreover, may very well be merely statistical, and we know that in a quite advanced society constant statistical averages may mark great individual differences. So far as I can see, the only respect in which this theory of matter differs in its practical outcome from the mere usual view is that there is always the possibility that the world of matter might some day wake up again like the Empire of Japan. Can it be theoretically maintained?

In the first place, matter as we know it is not exhausted in its qualities by saying that its actions are calculable. It also appears to be extended and movable. Now unless monads be extended and movable, it is difficult to see how any collection of them can seem to be so. Leibniz tried to explain this by saying that there were a great number of monads and that we perceived them confusedly. But the difficulty here is not that we perceive less than there is to perceive, but that we perceive something with *different* qualities and relations from what really is there. Hence we must either suppose that certain minds or certain collections of them really are extended and movable, or that we never perceive other monads but only have presentations caused by them. I understand the latter alternative to be rejected by Professor Ward, who mentions Reid in this connection with approval. I very much doubt whether it be really possible to reject representative ideas, but if so, we must certainly grant that some minds or at any rate some collections of minds are extended and stand in spatial relations to each other. I do not think there is anything impossible in such a view, but it is admittedly rather a startling one.

Professor Ward further discusses the question whether the view that the monads have acquired habits does not assume a fixed order and thus fail to explain it. His argument is that only what interests produces habits, and that what interests may very well be much more regular than our total experience. This is undoubtedly true, but it is also necessary that the recurrences should be pretty frequent, and selection cannot increase their frequency. Moreover, the monads at this low stage are supposed to have very short memories. Hence I am still doubtful whether in a world, with so little external recurrence as Professor Ward assumes, habits could arise.

We must now notice Professor Ward's discussion of Contingency with which is connected his doctrine of evolution as epigenesis. By the latter is meant that the higher stages depend for their existence on the lower ones, but that no amount of knowledge of the lower would have enabled us to forecast the higher. But we must not say that the higher stages are uncaused, because a distinction must be drawn between efficient and occasional causation, and it is only the latter that enables us to predict, whilst it is the former which is used in the Law of Universal Causation. Efficient causation, as I understand it, is the relation between a mind *quâ* active and its acts, so that the law of causation would become, 'Every event is some one's act.' Of course, this is not incompatible with every event having an occasional cause too. Actual recurrence is not essential to occasional causation, but only to the possibility of our finding out laws of occasional causation. Still, unless there be an *à priori* reason for supposing that every event has an occasional cause, we may admit that there is no reason why we should suppose one where, from the nature of the case, we cannot find it: and this is the actual state of affairs in many historical events and human actions. Professor Ward says that contingency must tend to decrease as time goes on. I cannot follow this. I understand that habitual actions are subject to occasional causation, and that, as time goes on, more and more actions become habitual. True, Professor Ward holds,—I am not very clear why,—that there will never be a time when *all* actions have become habitual, but at any rate we are certain that the mass of habitual action increases, and not certain that there is a proportionate increase in the free ones; for no positive reason is offered for supposing that the sleeping monads will ever wake. What we must take

Professor Ward to mean is that the friction due to mere misunderstanding and selfishness on the part of the intelligent monads will tend to a minimum. Thus three meanings of contingency are involved: (1) this friction, (2) collision between the volitions of intelligent monads and the habits of petrified ones, and (3) the fact that the behavior of non-petrified monads is not capable of prediction.

We must now regretfully leave the many other interesting points in the pluralistic part of the work and shortly consider the Theistic part. God is approached from a consideration of the upper and lower limits of pluralism, and the fact that without him the final unification cannot be taken as certain. The first consideration involves an explicit rejection of the principle of continuity, which has previously been accepted. Professor Ward does not seem to me to indicate any ground for thus accepting the principle so far, and arguing from it, and then rejecting it. Of course, a *last term* in the monadic hierarchy is probably compatible with the principle, but this would not be God whom Professor Ward always and rightly compares to a *limit*. Professor Ward admirably criticises a number of theories of creation, and ends by adopting a creative God, but confessing that creation is a mystery. It does not seem to me that this confession disconcerts him as much as might be expected. His argument here is that it would be very ominous for our theory of creation if it did not make creation a mystery, since it is something outside the world as a whole and not a relation between parts of it. But surely here 'the world' = the universe and that = the monads + God, so that creation is within the world from the philosophic point of view. But a more serious objection is that the mystery seems to lie not in the mere *modus operandi* of God (which would be tolerable enough), but in what is meant by creation. Until we can have some light on the second question, creation remains a mere word and as such it seems useless to philosophy and insusceptible of proof even by arguments based on ethical and religious considerations. Does it in fact come to more than the aspiration (or in some, the conviction) that in some way unknown to us things will turn out better than any empirical evidence can give us a certain warrant for believing?

A creative God having been accepted, the rest of the book is a theodicy. Speculative pessimism falls an easy victim to Pro-

fessor Ward's dialectics, and the author then turns to reconcile the admitted evils of the world with God's goodness. The line that he takes is that we must certainly suppose God to be bound by the laws of logic, and that, further, we must not attempt to suppose a world different in kind from the pluralistic one of free agents considered in the first part of the book. Hence the evil in the world is attributable to the defective use that the monads have made of their freedom, but God cannot be blamed for having made them free. What God did in creation was to limit possibilities, but not to close all but one; evil is due to wrong volitions of monads within the range of possibilities that God left open to them. This line of defense is a great deal more satisfactory in dealing with moral than with physical evil. Physical evil is due not so much to the erroneous volitions of higher monads (though it is partly so caused) as to those monads whose inherent incapacity for progress has made them crystalize into matter. Professor Ward's defense here is that the regularity of matter is of more value to the higher monads, in spite of the fact that it leads to some disasters, than would a less regular system be. Against this view I would suggest two objections: (1) I should have thought that immunity from physical disasters might have been cheaply bought at the price of occasional miracles. And the more the optimist insists on the infrequency of grave physical disasters, the less he can maintain that their aversion by miracles would be counterbalanced by the loss of the advantages due to regularity; and (2) Does not this defense treat the lower monads not as ends, but as means to the welfare of the higher monads? Surely Professor Ward's universe has in it a tragedy so vast that nothing like it exists in one where matter is lifeless, viz., the petrification of perhaps the vast majority of minds. And since we unhesitatingly use them as means, will not the principle of continuity suggest that monads higher than ourselves use us as means? Conditions of space have compelled me to neglect many interesting and important items in Professor Ward's book; but it is to be hoped that enough has been said to show that it teems with interest (and naturally with points of controversy) for all who can enjoy an earnest and brilliant attempt to grapple with the deepest questions of what the world is and what may be hoped from it.

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